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Costly Technology Adoption, Redistribution and Growth 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We study a political economy model which aims to understand the diversity in the growth 
and technology-adoption experiences in different economies. In this model the cost of 
technology adoption is endogenous and varies across heterogeneous agents. Agents in the 
model vote on the proportion of revenues allocated towards such expenditures. In the early 
stages of development, the political-economy outcome of the model ensures that a sub-
optimal proportion of government revenue is used to finance adoption-cost reducing 
expenditures. This sub-optimality is due to the presence of inequality; agents at the lower end 
of the distribution favour a larger amount of revenue allocated towards redistribution in the 
form of lump-sum transfers. Eventually all individuals make the switch to the better 
technology and their incomes converge. The outcomes of the model therefore explain why 
public choice is more likely to be conservative in nature; it represents the majority choice 
given conflicting preferences among agents. Consequently, the transition path towards 
growth and technology adoption varies across countries depending on initial levels of 
inequality. 
 
Key words: Economic growth, political economy, technology adoption, inequality, 
redistribution
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1. Introduction 
   The fact that policies and institutions are endogenous has been recognized in recent growth 
and development literature (Lucas 1990; Stokey and Rebelo 1995; Krusell et al. 1997; 
Huffman 2007; Acemoglu 2010). In the context of technology adoption – which has often 
been considered an important factor in economic development - one therefore has to consider 
whether redistributive revenues of the government may, in fact, be allocated towards 
reducing the fixed costs associated with productive technologies. To that end, this paper 
presents a political economy model in which the cost of technology adoption is endogenous. 
Specifically, the adoption cost is assumed to be a decreasing function of the amount of 
government revenue allocated towards cost-reducing research and development expenditures. 
Agents in the model vote on the proportion of revenues allocated towards such expenditures.  
      Several strands of literature provide inspiration for this study. Firstly, the early political 
economy literature involving voting by agents includes the work of Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), in which inequality and growth are negatively related, suggesting that the political 
economy mechanism does not necessarily ensure that the best policies are chosen. (Also see 
Alesina and Perotti, 1994, for a comprehensive discussion regarding this issue).  The 
conventional explanation for the negative relationship between inequality and growth that 
emerges in these models centres on the fact that, in a society with more unequal distribution 
of income, the poor will vote for a high level of taxation, which impedes investments and 
economic growth. In contrast to this idea, Li and Zou (1998) construct a model that produces 
a negative correlation between initial inequality and growth. Specifically, they show that, 
when government revenue is used to finance public consumption instead of production, poor 
agents in a more unequal society will vote for higher income taxation. However, depending 
upon the framework in question, diverse conclusions are possible in relation to these issues. 
      Secondly, the stylised facts that motivate this study are linked to the ongoing debate that 
was initially documented in Lucas (1993) and further discussed in Benabou (1996).  This 
debate relates to the idea that in a very egalitarian society, the distribution of income plays a 
significant role in the take-off to modern economic growth. That this phenomenon is 
pertinent to some countries or regions while not for others is apparent from the empirical 
evidence. See for example, Zweimuller (2000) and references therein. A priori, then, the 
political environment may provide an underlying theoretical rationale for such differences.  
      Another issue in relation to the above point that has been explored to a very limited 
degree in this literature relates to the implications for technology adoption in the presence of 
the politico-economic determination of policies. A notable exception is the model developed 
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by Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996). In a model with three-period lived agents they study the 
technology adoption process and how vested interests of agents account for policies that 
imply poor growth outcomes. Vested interests in their model arise due to the presence of 
different trade-offs faced by heterogeneous agents in relation to the technology adoption 
process. Agents operating the old technology benefit more from preventing the adoption of a 
new technology since they have not fully reaped the rewards from “learning by doing” that 
are associated with the old technology.  While their model has a very rich technological 
structure, this complexity entails a simplification of agents’ preferences which are assumed to 
be linear. The model constructed here, on the other hand, has more general preferences but a 
simpler technological structure. It is a political economy extension of Lahiri and Ratnasiri 
(2012), who show that, depending on initial conditions that relate to productivity differences 
between inferior and superior technologies, costly technology adoption can cause three 
alternative growth scenarios to emerge; they label these ‘poverty trap’, ‘dual economy’ and 
‘balanced growth’. The ‘poverty trap’ emerges when both the inferior and superior 
technologies in existence are of a low quality and the productivity differences between them 
are ‘small’ in a sense that is quantified using various parameters of the model. The ‘dual 
economy’ emerges when these productivity differences are large, with the inferior technology 
exhibiting a productivity level that is ‘low’ while the superior technology enjoys a ‘high’ 
productivity.  Finally ‘balanced growth’ is characterized by a situation in which all 
technologies are associated with ‘high’ productivity levels; in this case productivity 
differences do not matter as all agents end up adopting the superior technology in the long 
run.   
      An obvious policy implication, then, is to use the tax-transfer mechanism to ensure that 
either of the following three outcomes occurs: (a) agents adopt superior technologies due to 
direct transfers from rich to poor agents which make superior technologies affordable; (b) the 
government makes educational expenditures that facilitate better use of existing technologies, 
so that productivity levels associated with all technologies increase; (c)  the government 
reduces costs associated with the adoption of superior technologies through research and 
development expenditures.  However, as stated above, such policies may or may not be 
implemented, given that agents in an economy are heterogeneous, with differing trade-offs on 
various policy-dimensions, and preferences of the majority may not reflect what is optimal 
from a social point of view.  That is, the mix of redistributive expenditures that results from 
the political outcome may not be the same as the mix that is implemented by a social planner 
that maximizes the collective welfare of all agents in the economy.  This in turn can delay the 
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transition towards economic development, which, in terms of the model is characterized by 
the ‘balanced growth’ scenario. 
   Some empirical experiences of transitional economies such as India and China provide 
indirect evidence in support of this idea. In relation to agricultural technology adoption, in 
particular, the differences between China and India are striking.  Both countries have invested 
substantial investment in research and development in agricultural technologies since the 
1990s.  However while China has sustained and even increased this effort, India has only 
maintained it. (See Figure 1(a)). In terms of outcomes, this has been reflected in an 
agricultural “productivity slowdown” in India. In China too, growth rates in productivity have 
been slower relative to the spurt experienced in the 1990s, but in contrast to India this 
slowdown is not as dramatic. (See Lahiri and Ratnasiri, forthcoming).   See also Figure 1(b) 
which reflects the more dramatic increase in Agricultural GDP in China relative to India.  
 
  
Figure 1(a) Agricultural research and 
development expenditure (Million 
2005 PPP Dollars) 
Figure 1(b) Agricultural GDP (Million 2005 
PPP Dollars) 
(Source:  ASTI database as published in Beintema et al, 2012) 
 
      There is also a ‘political economy’ angle to these experiences.  There is often a refrain, 
especially in popular media, but also in academic circles, that India, being a democracy, is in 
a weaker position to implement growth inducing policies, given that any policy passed by the 
government may have several vested-interest groups in opposition to it (See Mukherjee and 
Zhang, 2007).  Typically, policy and institutional reforms affecting agriculture have not been 
as radical in India as they have been in China (Fuglie and Schimmelpfennig, 2010). For a 
further discussion of the role of conflicting interests in policy formation, see Krusell and 
Rios-Rull (1996) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). 
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     In this paper we extend the Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012) framework to explicitly examine 
such issues. We do this by incorporating a vote by the agents on a parameter that represents 
the mix between two types of redistributive expenditures, one which achieves redistribution 
through direct lump-sum income and wealth transfers from rich to poor agents, and another 
which reduces the cost of adopting superior technologies through research and development 
expenditures.  Our objective is to examine whether the political process delays the adoption 
of superior technologies, thereby slowing the transition to economic development. 
      Interestingly, results here indicate that even in the absence of the type of technological 
trade-offs present in Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) – which prevent adoption of new 
technologies because of vested interests of agents who have not fully reaped the ‘learning by 
doing’ benefits of old technologies - there can be a delay in the adoption of more productive 
technologies.  This delay in the adoption occurs at the lower end of the income distribution 
which is characterized by reversals in the technology adoption and growth process. The 
technology with lower productivity is used by the majority of individuals in the early stages 
of development. During this stage they prefer a very low proportion of government revenue 
to be used to finance adoption-cost reducing expenditures.  
      At this stage the income distribution is characterized by a relatively higher level of 
inequality. As capital deepening and redistribution of income and wealth takes place, the 
inequality among individuals tends to decrease. Once this happens, individuals prefer a 
relatively larger proportion of government revenue to be allocated towards cost-reducing 
research and development expenditures. Eventually all individuals make the switch to the 
better technology and consequently their incomes converge. The economy is characterized by 
balanced growth. 
      The trade-offs in this model relate to the choice of the alternative mechanisms of 
redistribution mentioned above.  The political equilibrium is characterized by situations in 
which the agents at the lower end of the distribution may influence the outcome. In fact, the 
agents at the bottom end of the distribution prefer redistribution in the form of the lump-sum 
transfer rather than cost reducing research and development expenditure.1 This leads to an 
                                                 
1 In terms of the model developed here, this type of government expenditure can be viewed as revenue 
channelled towards a variety of investments that reduce the costs associated with adopting more productive 
technologies. For example, during the green revolution in the 1970s, agricultural research investments that were 
directed towards invention of high yielding varieties (HYV) of crops in India and elsewhere, significantly 
reduced production costs,  which led to a wide-spread adoption HYVs (Fan, 2002). This type of expenditure 
could also include institutional reforms that directly lead to a reduction in costs associated with the adoption of 
superior technologies, such as, for example, developments in infrastructure. 
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outcome in which a less than optimal amount of government revenue is allocated towards 
expenditure aimed at reducing costs of adoption. The outcomes of the model then explain the 
diversity in growth and technology adoption experiences across countries.  Depending on 
initial levels of inequality, the transition path is characterized by fluctuations and reversals in 
technology adoption and growth, and this is mainly due to the presence of a political process 
that makes policies endogenous. 
     Another outcome of the model is that there is a positive relationship between initial 
inequality and economic growth, albeit not as striking as in some other political-economy 
literature, such as, for example, in Li and Zou (1998). This outcome is also consistent with 
empirical observations of Perotti (1992, 1993, 1996), and Lindert (1996). Specifically, in our 
model, higher initial inequality in income and wealth promotes slightly faster growth rates 
among the poorer cohorts of the income distribution in the transitional stages of the economy. 
This switch to the better technology, then, is likely to happen sooner when the initial 
inequality is high. However, in a quantitative sense, the numerical experiments of the paper 
suggest a relatively small difference in growth rates for different levels of initial inequality. 
      The section that follows describes the economic environment of the model. Section 3 
reports results of various numerical experiments that involve varying some of the parameters 
of the model and the initial distributions of capital and wealth.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Economic Environment 
The economy, which may be considered an extension of Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012) consists 
of two-period lived overlapping generations of agent. There are N agents and there is 
heterogeneity in their holdings of wealth and capital. An agent born in period t inherits a 
certain amount of capital and wealth.   The initial distribution of the composite capital and 
wealth endowment is described by F( . ).  Time is discrete, with t = 0, 1, 2, …   
      There is an adoption cost associated with the better technology. In contrast to Lahiri and 
Ratnasiri (2012), this cost is endogenous, and dependant on cost-reducing public 
expenditures on research and development (R&D). Consequently, this modification also 
entails a role for the government. Specifically, a proportion (φ ) of government tax revenue is 
used to finance expenditure aimed at reducing adoption costs associated with the advanced 
technology.  The government raises revenue by means of an income and wealth tax. The tax 
rate (τ) is levied on the heterogeneous resource endowments Wit of young agents in the 
economy.  The distribution of resource endowment is described by a density function f(Wit) 
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with support [0, υ]. The government tax revenue raised in any period is then given by 
titititt WdWWfWGR ττ
υ
== ∫
0
)(  .  The variable gt, which refers to the amount of government 
tax revenue that is used to finance the adoption cost associated with technology B is then 
given by  tt Wg φτ=  . The remainder of the government revenue is given to the young agents 
as lump-sum transfers (trt), which are given by tt Wtr τφ)1( −= . At the “first stage” of each 
period, the agents vote over desired value of φ  and the political outcome is determined by the 
majority rule. 
    In the “second stage” of period t, considering the political outcome, individuals have to 
choose one of two technologies in order to produce output.  These two technologies are 
referred to as Technology A and Technology B. Here, Technology A is associated with lower 
productivity relative to Technology B but does not involve any adoption cost. On the other 
hand, Technology B is associated with a higher productivity but involves an adoption cost. 
The adoption cost is specified as a decreasing function of the amount of government tax 
revenue that is used to finance this cost viz. (gt). To our knowledge, related theoretical 
literature does not consist of an example for a specific functional form for )( tgδ .  However, 
it is intuitively plausible that any reasonable specification for )( tgδ  must fulfil the following 
conditions:  
(i) 0)(' <gδ ; 0)(" >gδ . 
(ii) 0)(lim =
∞→
g
g
δ . 
For the numerical experiments conducted in the next section )( tgδ  is specified as 






+
=
)1(
)(
t
t g
g δδ , where δδ =)0( . 
The economy produces output (Y) using composite human and physical capital (K) 
and the production relationships F(K) assume simple “AK” specifications. Here, the total 
factor productivities associated with the two technologies are denoted by parameters A and B 
where AB > .  
The agents born in period t maximize the following lifetime utility function, taking 
into account what has occurred in the previous two stages.  
)ln()ln()ln()ln(),,,( 12111111 ++++++ +++= itititititititit sxccsxccU βθβθβ   (1) 
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   Here, itc  and 1+itc denote the agents’ consumption in the first and second period of life 
respectively. Each agent is born with a unit of unskilled labour endowment that may be 
supplied inelastically to earn a subsistence wage w . They also receive resources in the form 
of bequests from their parents. Part of this bequest is given by xit+1, which represents the 
wealth left to the next generation. Parents also provide children with a share (α) of their 
second period income. This component of bequests received by the young is represented by 
the variable 1+its . The parameter β  is the subjective discount factor and θ1 and θ2 are 
parameters representing the extent of intergenerational altruism in the model.   
      The agents born in period t use their net wage-income plus wealth endowment and 
government transfer payments for consumption and capital accumulation in the first period.  
In the second period, they use returns to their capital holdings to finance consumption and 
bequests.  
   Households adopting Technology A face the following budget constraints: 
))1(())(1(1 tit
a
it
a
it WWwKc τφτ −++−=+ +      (2) 
a
it
a
it
a
it xAKc 111 )1( +++ −−= α        (3) 
Here aitc , 
a
itc 1+  and
a
itK 1+  respectively refer to first period consumption, second period 
consumption and second period capital holding of the ith individual who has adopted 
Technology A. As mentioned before, the variable itW  represents the resource endowment of 
ith agent in period t. In this model, the resource endowment that an agent can earn depends on 
the technology that has been adopted by agent’s parents. This means that ait
a
it
a
itit sxWW +==  
if the agent’s parent adopted Technology A and bit
b
it
b
itit sxWW +==  if the agent’s parent 
adopted Technology B. The bequests that arise from parents’ second period income 
t
a
it AKs α=)(  if the agent’s parent adopted Technology A, and t
b
it BKs α=)(  if the agent’s 
parent adopted Technology B. Households adopting Technology B, on the other hand, face 
the constraints:    
))1(()())(1(1 ttit
b
it
b
it WgWwKc τφδτ −+−+−=+ +      (4) 
.)1( 111
b
it
b
it
b
it xBKc +++ −−= α        (5) 
Note that a household specific adoption cost (δ) of adopting Technology B is experienced by 
the agents in period t.  
9 
 
      The optimal plans for consumption, bequests and capital accumulation that take place in 
the third stage are described by the following equations. Agents adopting Technology A will 
have: 
[ ]))1(())(1(
)(
1
2
tit
a
a
it WWwc τφτρ
−++−=       (6) 
[ ]))1(())(1(
2
1
1 tit
a
aa
it WWwc τφτρ
ρ
−++−=+       (7) 
[ ]))1(())(1(
2
1
11 tit
a
aa
it WWwx τφτρ
ρ
θ −++−=+       (8)  
[ ]))1(())(1(
)()1(
)1(
2
11
1 tit
a
aa
it WWwA
K τφτ
ρ
ρ
α
θ
−++−
−
+
=+     (9) 
Likewise, agents who adopt Technology B will have: 
[ ])())1(())(1(
)(
1
2
ttit
b
b
it WWWwc φτδτφτρ
−−++−=     (10) 
[ ])())1(())(1(
)( 2
1
1 ttit
b
bb
it WWWwc φτδτφτρ
ρ
−−++−=+     (11) 
[ ])())1(())(1(
)( 2
1
11 ttit
b
bb
it WWWwx φτδτφτρ
ρ
θ −−+++=+    (12) 
[ ])())1(())(1(
)()1(
)1(
2
11
1 ttit
b
bb
it WWWwB
K φτδτφτ
ρ
ρ
α
θ
−−++−
−
+
=+   (13) 
where,  






+
+−=
αθ
θ
αβρ
)1(
)1(
1
2
1 Aa  and 





+
+−=
αθ
θ
αβρ
)1(
)1(
1
2
1 Bb  



 +++= )})1(({1 212 Aa α
θ
θβρ  and. 


 +++= )})1(({1 212 Bb α
θ
θβρ  
 
The ith agent will adopt technology B iff        
),,(),,( ititit
A
ititit
B sxKUsxKU ≥          (14) 
   where AU  and BU  represent the indirect utility functions for agents adopting the A and B 
technologies respectively.  It is then easy to show the following result which is described 
below in Proposition 1.  (See Appendix 1 for a proof). 
Proposition 1:   Let ;
)1)((
)())1)(((
12
2
*
21* wgWW tt −−−
+−−
=
τσσ
σδτφσσ   
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 where 
)1(1
)1(
1
1
1
21
21
θθβ
θθβ
ρ
ρ
σ
+++
++






=
b
a  and  





=
b
a
2
2
2 ρ
ρ
σ . A household will adopt technology B iff 
*
tit WW ≥ . 
Proposition 1 describes a threshold level of resources ( *itW ) above which households will 
choose to adopt Technology B. This threshold is decreasing in the proportion of the 
government revenue used to finance R&D expenditures.  
      For this reason, it is hard to explicitly analyse the political outcome in the first stage.  
However, in order to look at how agents will vote for the desired φ , the effect of changes in 
φ  on an agent’s indirect utility functions ),( τφitV is considered here.  This specifically 
involves examination of ),(' τφitV  for each individual. This type of analysis does not offer an 
explicit solution for the political outcome. However, we are able to identify certain 
benchmarks that allow a characterization of the political outcome.  Specifically, this exercise 
attempts to identify conditions under which agents prefer extreme values of (φ ) (i.e. a value 
of (φ ) equal to 0 or 1).   If ),(' τφitV  is decreasing or increasing over the entire range of 
)1,0(∈φ  the political outcome is characterized by a “corner solution”.  Otherwise, the 
political outcome is characterized by an “interior solution”- a situation in which agents prefer 
(0<φ <1).  
      In order to interpret these conditions, two sets of individuals in this economy are 
identified: (i) agents who are in the lower end of the income distribution- whose resource 
endowments are strictly less than the threshold level of resources ( *itit WW << ), and (ii) agents 
in the upper end of the income distribution- whose resource endowments are above the 
threshold level of resources ( *itit WW > ). Note again that the critical level of resources (
*
itW ) is 
a decreasing function of (φ ). Therefore changes associated with (φ ) also change the number 
of agents in these two sets. This means that some agents at the top end of the first set are 
likely to switch to the second set as (φ ) changes. The conditions for the two sets of 
individuals are summarized in the following proposition (See Appendix 2 for a proof of this 
proposition). 
Proposition 2: 
(i) For agents, *itit WW << ,   φτφ ∀< ,0),(
'
itV   ; all agents in this group vote for 0=φ  
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(ii) For agents, *itit WW > ,   ),(
' τφitV  is ambiguous; the  agents in this group prefer a value of 
)1,0(∈φ  iff   1)]('[ =− tWφτδ   
   Overall, this proposition implies that the poorer agents prefer redistribution in the form of 
the lump-sum transfer, while richer individuals prefer redistribution in the form cost reducing 
R&D expenditure. These issues are also analyzed in the quantitative experiments discussed in 
the next section.  
 
3. Numerical Experiments 
     Next we present results of numerical experiments conducted using the model developed in 
this paper. However, we first briefly summarize the outcomes of the model in the absence of 
redistribution and the political economy feature discussed in the previous section. This 
amounts to discussing the outcomes of the benchmark model which is presented in Lahiri and 
Ratnasiri (2012). Essentially in that model there are three outcomes depending on the 
parameters that describe productivity differences between the two technologies. The three 
growth scenarios that emerge are ‘poverty trap’, ‘dual economy’ and ‘balanced growth’.  In 
the presence of redistribution, however, the economy moves to balanced growth regardless of 
the initial conditions. To that end it is relevant to discuss outcomes of the extended model for 
only one set of parameters for productivity; we choose the parameters associated with the 
‘balanced growth’ case. The outcomes for the other two cases analogous to the case presented 
below.  
     The parameter values for the numerical experiments below are as follows.  A=3, B=5, 
β =0.95, θ1 = θ2 =0.95, α= 0.05, d =2, 2.0=τ , w =5, )1,0(∈φ .2 Firstly, we examine how 
voting on φ  takes place in the political process.  The experiment conducted here looks at the 
proportion of individuals that vote for different values of φ . The key mechanisms of the 
model are described in the discussion below and will be illustrated shortly using specific 
numerical experiments.  
     In the early stages, the majority of agents prefer redistribution in the form of lump-sum 
transfers. The political outcome at this stage is then characterized by φ  = 0 and the majority 
of the agents adopt Technology A. However, in the latter stages political outcome is 
characterized by a relatively higher value of φ  , so that some of the government revenue goes 
                                                 
2 Note our quantitative experiments involve the use of parameters that are not strictly calibrated to a specific 
economy. Given the stylized nature of our model, this is not feasible. Therefore, the interpretations that follow 
are of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature. 
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towards adoption cost-reducing R&D expenditures associated with technology B.  At a later 
stage in the growth process these expenditures are no longer needed and the political 
economy outcome reverts back to the φ =0 case.   
The underlying reason for this outcome can be explained as follows.  As discussed 
above, there are two sets of agents who vote for different values of φ . The first set (i.e. 
agents at the lower end of income distribution) prefer redistribution in the form of the lump-
sum transfer3 while the second set (i.e. agents in the top end of the income distribution) prefer 
that a positive fraction of the government tax revenue is used to finance cost reducing 
expenditure associated with the adoption of Technology B. The first set votes for a value of 
φ  = 0 while the second set votes for a higher value (0.05) of φ . Over time however, as 
redistribution takes place, agents who are at the top end of the first set also wish to allocate 
tax revenue on cost reducing R&D expenditure. At this stage these agents have accumulated 
sufficient resources through capital deepening and this allows them to make the switch from 
Technology A to B. Therefore the proportion of agents who vote for lower value of φ  
decreases and the political outcome is now characterized by a relatively higher value of φ .  
Once all agents adopt Technology B, they vote for a relatively lower value of φ ,  and 
eventually the winning value of φ  reaches zero. At this stage the adoption cost associated 
with the Technology B has reached its minimum and there are no further gains from R&D 
investment in cost reduction.  
We now turn to specific numerical experiments that illustrate the above process. First 
we discuss figure 2 (a) which presents the adoption of Technologies A and B over time for 
the entire economy. As we can see in that figure the number of early adopters is quite small, 
at around 2% of the total number of agents in the economy. However there is a rapid shift in 
subsequent periods and by period 4 all agents have switched to the better technology. Note 
that, in contrast to the benchmark framework of Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012), redistribution in 
the political economy framework of this model ensures the attainment of “balanced growth” 
regardless of the initial conditions. However, in the presence of the redistribution this 
outcome is attained sooner. 
 
                                                 
3 We determine this numerically by looking at each agent’s indirect utility function for different values of φ . 
However, for the initial period, proposition 2 shows analytically that agents at the lower end of the income 
distribution prefer .0=φ  
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Figure 2 (a): Number of households adopting 
Technology A or B in different 
time periods. 
Figure 2 (b): Gini coefficient in different 
time periods. 
 
In relation to the point above, it is also interesting to look at the implication of the 
above process for the evolution of inequality within the economy over time.  At early stages 
the income distribution is characterized by a relatively higher level of inequality. In the 
presence of a redistributive mechanism, inequality decreases over time and after complete 
adoption of Technology B the level of inequality converges to zero (See Figure 2(b)). Again 
this is in contrast to Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012) in which inequality persists in the “balanced 
growth” economy. This outcome of the model appears to support the idea that the downward 
segment of the ‘Kuznets curve’ is driven by issues related to political reform and its 
consequences- a fact described in contemporary political economy literature (For example, 
see Lindert, 1994). The underlying political mechanism which we described in detail 
previously is illustrated in Figures 3(a) and 3 (b).  As we can observe from these figures there 
is a political preference for relatively small level of expenditure on R&D in the early stages 
of development (φ  is approximately 0.1at its peak). Once all agents adopt Technology B the 
entire revenue available for redistribution is used to finance lump-sum transfers (φ =0). In all 
cases the outcomes reflect the preferences of a majority of agents in the economy. See figure 
3(b), which plots the proportion of agents that have voted for the winning outcome.  
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Figure 3 (a): Winning φ  in different time 
periods.  
Figure 3 (b): Proportion of households voting 
in favour of winning φ  in 
different time periods 
 
      
       We also examine the implications for the pattern of growth rates of output over time.  
Specifically we look at the patterns of growth for households that are in the lowest 20%, the 
highest 20%, and the mean and median positions in the income distribution. These patterns 
show a significant amount of diversity across different cohorts of households. As illustrated 
in Figure 4(a) richer households in the model show a monotonic pattern of growth while 
growth rates of poor and median households are characterized by rapid growth and reversals. 
Our intuition for these reversals is as follows: The first time a particular dynasty adopts the 
better technology they can afford to leave a smaller amount of resources for the next 
generation in the form of bequests. In that case the next generation may not have enough 
resources to adopt the better technology, leading to a reversal in the growth rate. 
      However, eventually the output of all individuals in this economy converges to a unique 
steady state growth rate. It is apparent from this figure, however, that the output of agents 
who are at the bottom end of income distribution initially grows at a rapid rate relative to the 
growth rate of output of agents that are at the top end of income distribution.  Interestingly, 
the growth rate for the poorer cohorts of agents is higher for higher levels of initial inequality 
in the income distribution (See Figure 4(b)).  
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Figure 4(a): Growth rates experienced by 
the various cohorts of 
households. 
Figure 4(b): Gini coefficient in different time 
periods with varying levels of 
initial inequality. 
 
     Next, we examine the extent to which political outcomes differ from welfare maximizing 
ones. Here, we use a utilitarian concept for the social welfare function. The collective welfare 
of the economy is represented by the sum of utilities of all its agents.  We therefore consider 
the value of φ  that maximizes this collective social welfare function. It is interesting to 
observe that the policy choices in these two cases are significantly different, particularly in 
the transition period before complete adoption of the advanced technology. As illustrated in 
Figure 5, the individuals always vote for a small value of φ  while a welfare maximization 
point of view suggests that relatively larger value is optimal. This bears out the fact that 
aggregate outcome in a political economy is likely to be conservative in nature, as it 
represents the majority choice among conflicting preferences of households. This is an issue 
often discussed in public choice literature (Besley and Coate, 2003). 
Secondly, implications of these two scenarios are considered for the evolution of 
inequality and growth.   It is clear from Figure 6(a) that the political process slows down the 
process of technology adoption relative to the optimum welfare policy. This is a key result of 
the model as it highlights the role the political process plays in slowing down technology 
adoption and economic development. This aspect of the model, in part, appears to support the 
idea that technology adoption always involves some kind of resistance from agents as 
discussed in Mokyr (1993) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996). Such delays are also reflected 
in the empirical experiences of various countries, such as, for example, India and China 
discussed earlier in the introduction. The model therefore has potential for explaining the 
diversity in the growth and technology adoption path taken by different economies. 
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However, as in Figure 6(b) the reduction in inequality does not differ noticeably 
across these two cases.  Nevertheless, if we look at the growth outcomes for various cohorts 
in the income distribution, there are some striking differences between the political economy 
and welfare maximizing cases (See Figure 7). In the case of political economy outcomes, the 
rate of growth in the transition period before technology adoption is characterized by drastic 
rises and falls relative to the case that involves a welfare maximizing path. Basically, the 
political process entails a lower value of φ  as evident from Figure 5. This means that 
dynasties at the lower end of the distribution leave smaller bequests to subsequent 
generations who then do not have enough to invest in technology B, leading to a reversal in 
the growth process. However eventually, the economy converges to the same steady-state 
growth rate.  In terms of this feature of the model, it is clear that if fundamental 
characteristics of economies are similar, they eventually converge to an identical rate of 
growth regardless of the alternate policy choices.4 
 
 
Figure 5: Winning value of φ  under welfare maximization path and political process. 
 
                                                 
4 Note that this ‘conditional convergence’ is distinct from the type of convergence discuss with reference to the 
Solow growth model. Here it occurs as result of redistribution. In the absence of redistribution inequality 
increases over time, as this is essentially an endogenous growth model.  
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Figure 6 (a) Number of households adopting 
technology B under welfare 
maximization path and the 
political process. 
Figure 6 (b) Evolution of Gini coefficient over 
time under welfare maximization 
path and political process. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Growth rates experienced by the different cohorts of households under welfare 
maximization path and political process. 
      
     Finally, we explore the implications of varying the levels of tax rates for the technology 
adoption process. In the model, taxes enter in a very simple way, given that labour supply in 
this economy is inelastic. An obvious consequence of this is that higher taxes have positive 
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implications for technology adoption and economic growth. Intuitively, higher taxes imply a 
faster redistribution of income and wealth which enables poorer households to pay for the 
adoption costs associated with Technology B. This in turn reduces the income and wealth 
inequality among the agents in this economy. 
      Another obvious feature of the model relates to the implications for varying tax levels on 
diverse growth patterns of different cohorts of households in the income distribution.  High 
income and wealth taxes in the model therefore hasten the arrival of steady state growth. 
Moreover, the rate at which the economy grows at the steady state increases with higher tax 
rates. 
      The results presented above can be compared with the results of a case that does not 
involve a redistribution process. It is obvious that, if we set τ = 0, the model collapses to the 
benchmark model and the political economy process become irrelevant - as there is no 
government revenue the  vote on the parameter φ  is irrelevant. In order to illustrate the 
beneficial nature of the taxation however, we set income and wealth tax rate equal to a value 
which is very close to zero (τ = 0.001) and analyze the outcome of the model.  Results 
suggest that a very low rate of taxation increases inequality in the process of technology 
adoption.  In the long run, however, inequality tends to decrease. (See Figure 8). The 
implication of this feature for cross country differences in the evolution of income is obvious. 
That is, countries in which effective taxation systems exist are likely to reduce inequality 
sooner. 
 
 
Figure 8: Evolution of inequality with and without taxes.  
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   Furthermore, results here suggest that the growth patterns of households are relatively 
smooth and monotonic and are less likely to be characterized by reversals in the presence of 
higher tax rates. A significantly low tax rate characterizes reversals in the growth rates 
particularly in the cases of poorer and median households.  However, as illustrated in Figure 
9, output of poor and median agents grows rapidly relative to the richer households.  
 
Figure 9: Growth rates experienced by the different cohorts of households with and without 
taxes. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
   Contemporary literature on the political economy of development suggests that, to some 
extent, political considerations behind policy determination provide a potential explanation 
for uneven growth records within and across countries. This paper develops a model to 
accommodate such political considerations. The assumption here is that the adoption cost 
associated with the better technologies depends on cost reducing public expenditures on 
R&D. The proportion of government tax revenue used to finance this expenditure is 
determined by a political process. 
   The model constructed here suggests that agents at the bottom end of the income 
distribution prefer redistribution in the form of the lump-sum transfers while agents at the top 
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end of the distribution prefer redistribution in the form of cost reducing R&D. The political 
outcome depends on the majority of votes. Over time however, as capital deepening and 
redistribution takes place, complete adoption to Technology B is inevitable and the economy 
converges to a steady state. Furthermore, the growth patterns of households are relatively 
smooth and monotonic and are less likely to be characterized by reversals. A significantly 
low tax rate characterizes reversals in the growth rates particularly in the cases of poorer and 
median households. 
      Furthermore, the results appear to support the fact that the policies chosen through the 
political economy mechanism do not necessarily ensure maximum welfare of the society. In 
particular, during the transition period before complete adoption of the advanced technology, 
public choice of policy is different from that of the social planner. In terms of our model, this 
means that there are delays in adoption of cost reducing R&D due to the smaller proportion 
of government revenues allocated to such expenditures, relative to what is optimal. This is, in 
part, consistent with Mokyr’s (1990) idea that adoption of technologies often faces severe 
‘resistance’ of various interest groups. This is also consistent with outcomes that occur in the 
model of Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996). In that model ‘vested interests’ of the political elite  
lead to a slower pace of technological change. There are also discussions in the empirical 
literature that suggest political-economy related reasons for a slowing down of reforms that 
alleviate costs associated with technology adoption. See, for example Fuglie and 
Schimmelpfennig (2010). The political economy mechanism of our model, then, provides a 
potential explanation of the diverse experiences of transitional economies in relation to 
growth and technology adoption. 
Some of the implications of the model developed here suggest several useful 
directions for further research. Alternative mechanisms of redistribution could introduce 
different types of trade-offs that have not been explicitly analyzed here.  For example 
government revenue could be used to finance other public goods such as health care, 
environment etc. Depending on the menu of choices available one could then have different 
outcomes for the proportion of revenue allocated to cost reducing R&D expenditure. This 
point has been considered for example in Lahiri and Magnani (2008). Another interesting 
direction of research could consider a longer time horizon for the lifetime of the agents in the 
model. 
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 
Households adopt Technology B iff indirect utility of Technology B is greater that indirect 
utility of Technology A. This implies households adopt Technology B  
iff  ),,,(),,,( 111111
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This means taht agents will adopt Technology B  
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Substituting for bitc , and 
a
itc ,   as in the Chapter 4, it is possible to define threshold level of 
resourses required for households to adopt more productive technology )( *itW  as follows. 
;
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where 1σ  and 2σ are defined as in Chapter 4.  
 
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 
For agents *itit WW << , derive utility from using Technology A. Therefore their indirect utility 
function (given in equation 1) can be re-written in terms of proportion (φ ) as follows by 
substitution of optimal plans for consumption, bequests and capital accumulation.  
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Simplifying this, we can rewrite as follows.  
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